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IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD:
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM
BABY JESSICA AND BABY RICHARD?
GREGORY A. KELSON*

No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in
his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood
relationship.I

Legal training and experience are of little practical help in
solving the complex problems of human relations. However,
these problems do arise and under our system of government,
2
the burden of renderinga final decision rests upon us.
INTRODUCTION

For a two-and-a-half-year-old girl, the day began just like any
other. She awoke and probably had some breakfast. Her adoptive
mother was packing some of her items. The little girl had been
told the previous night that she would be moving.3 Later, her
adoptive parents took her on a two-hour family outing, her mother
in the back seat with the girl sobbing.' She pushed the little girl
on her swing and kissed her on the cheek before she finished
packing her bag.5 At the appointed hour, the adoptive parents'
lawyer came for her and strapped her into a car seat in a minivan
filled with her possessions.6 As she was driven to a police station
in Ann Arbor, Michigan, she screamed, "I want my dad. Where's
my dad?"7 At the police station, she was handed over to her
biological parents for a flight to their home in Iowa."
* Executive Director, Institute for Women and Children's Policy, Chicago,
Illinois. The Author would like to thank Professor Ralph Brill of Chicago-Kent
College of Law and Professor Nanette Elster of University of Illinois-Chicago
for their insights on this Article.
1. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
2. Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 153 (Iowa 1966).
3. Desda Moss, Child's Painful Parting:Jessica Handed to Birth Parents,
USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 1993, at Al.
4. Id.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Moss, supra,note 3, at Al.
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In a Chicago suburb, a four-year-old boy was probably having
a similar morning. His adoptive parents also told him that he
would be moving.9 Later, the biological parents and the adoptive
parents' Lutheran pastor arrived at the house. 0 The two couples
spent some time playing with the boy, and an hour later the pastor
came out of the house to appeal to the crowd that had gathered to
remain calm. 1 The boy's adoptive mother came out of the house
carrying the boy, who was tightly holding on to her.12 As the
biological father-whom the boy had just met-took him from her,
he screamed loudly. 3 The biological father, his wife (the boy's
biological mother) and their lawyer climbed into a van and sped off
to their home in another Chicago suburb, leaving the boy's
adoptive family crying uncontrollably. 4
The little girl in the first scenario was known as Jessica
DeBoer to her adoptive parents Jan and Roberta DeBoer, and as
"Baby Jessica" to the rest of the country."' The little boy in the
second scenario was known as "Baby Richard." 6 In both cases, the
court of last resort in their home states, Michigan and Illinois
respectively, ordered that these children be taken from the only
home they ever knew and given to their biological parents, whom
they had never met." A determinative factor in both cases was
that the biological fathers of the children were never consulted
before the adoptions were finalized. 8 Thus, neither state felt that
it was appropriate to weigh "the best interest of the child" in
ordering final custody. 9
Yet, the rights of children in general2 and in adoption cases
9. Janan Hanan & Peter Kendall, Wrenching Day for "Richard'Boy Begins
Trip in Tears, Ends It Calmly, CIn. TRIB., May 1, 1995, § 1, at 1.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

14. Hanan & Kendall, supra note 9, at 13.

15. Moss, supra note 3, at Al.
16. 'Richard'Inquiry Halted by Bilandic[:]Illinois Supreme Court Justice

Stops Reopening of Case, CHi. TRIB., July 29, 1997 § 1, at 1. The adoptive
parents, who were known as John and Jane Doe during the litigation, are
Robert and Kimberly Warburton. Baby Richard is now known to his biological
parents, Otakar and Daniella Kirchner, as Daniel. Id.
17. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ill. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1303,
1304 (1994); In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 664 (Mich. 1993) affd,
509 U.S. 1301, 1301 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1993).

18. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 651; Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
19. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 667; Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
20. See, e.g., Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children'sRights?, 80
MINN. L. REV. 267, 269-85 (1995) (investigating the potential effect of
historical analysis on the future of children's rights); Hillary Rodham,
Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. ED. REV. 487, 505-07 (1973) (arguing that

courts should determine the competence of children on a case-by-case basis).
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specifically2' are issues that have fostered great debate. Both
biological parents and third parties, such as adoptive or foster
parents, have fought for custody of children without the child
having any say in the matter.
This Article re-examines both the Baby Jessica and Baby
Richard custody cases by defining what exactly is the "best
interest of the child" standard that a court should use in applying
the law. Part I revisits the cases of Baby Jessica in Michigan and
Baby Richard in Illinois. Part II analyzes the best interest of the
child standard. Part III investigates what, if any, rights children
have in adoption proceedings. Finally, Part IV determines steps a
court should take in determining custody after a child has reached
a certain age.
I.

REVISITING BABY JESSICA AND BABY RICHARD

This Section re-examines the cases of Baby Jessica 2 and Baby
Richard.' These cases clarify how the best interest of the child
standard should have been applied to these and similar cases.
Interestingly, the Baby Jessica case involved a battle of
jurisdiction between two states, while the Baby Richard case
involved the rights of putative fathers in adoption proceedings.
A. The Case of Baby Jessica
Other than the Baby M surrogacy case in New Jersey,n no
21. See Andrew S. Rosenman, Note, Babies Jessica, Richard, and Emily:
The Need for Legislative Reform of Adoption Laws, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1851,

1878-90 (1995) (proposing legislative reforms because of recent cases); Michael
A. Weinberg, Note, DeBoer v. Schmidt: Disregardingthe Child's Best Interest
in Adoption Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 1099, 1134-38 (1994) (arguing

that courts should focus on the best interests of the children instead of
parental rights).
22. See, e.g., Kyker v. Kyker, 1996 WL 67178, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)

(holding that the trial court erred by not considering the best interest of the
child); Martin v. Martin, 1994 WL 247194, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)

(affirming custody decision that went against psychologist's recommendation);
Delzer v. Winn, 491 N.W.2d 741, 746 (N.D. 1992) (holding that improvements
in non-custodial parent's life should not change custody terms); Funk v.
Ossman, 724 P.2d 1247, 1250-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding best interest of
child barred father from providing child with religious indoctrination); Dale
County Dep't of Pensions & Sec. v. Robles, 368 So. 2d 39, 43 (Ala. Civ. App.
1979) (affirming decision giving custody to parents when no signs of physical
abuse were present); Lewis v. Lewis, 537 P.2d 204, 209 (Kan. 1975) (affirming

decision to not change terms of custody after parent made lifestyle changes).
23. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 649.

24. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 181.
25. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).

This was a custody case

between the surrogate mother and biological father of a female child. For a
detailed analysis of this case, see generally LORI B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN
STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS, AND BRAVE NEW
BABIEs (1989).
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other child custody case has drawn as much attention as that of
BabyJessica. 8 This case not only.waged a battle for custody of
Baby Jessica between her biological and adoptive parents, but also
waged a battle for jurisdiction between the states of Iowa and
Michigan.
Cara Clausen gave birth to Baby Jessica 7 on February 8,
1991.28 Ms. Clausen was not married at the time and decided to
give the baby up for adoption. 9 She signed a release of custody on
February 10, 1991 and named Scott Seefeldt as the father. ° Mr.
31
14, 1991.
Seefeldt executed a release of custody form on February

A hearing followed in juvenile court on February 25, 1991,
terminating Ms. Clausen and Mr. Seefeldt's parental rights. 2 The
court awarded temporary custody of the child to Roberta and Jan
DeBoer, who returned to Michigan with the child."
Nine days after the DeBoers received custody of Baby Jessica,
Ms. Clausen filed a motion to revoke her release of custody. 4 In
an affidavit, Ms. Clausen said that she lied about the identity of
the father and that the real father was Daniel Schmidt. 5 Mr.

26. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 649.
27. The child's biological parents changed her name to Anna Schmidt.
Moss, supra note 3, at Al. For the sake of clarity in this Article, the Author
will refer to the child as Baby Jessica.
28. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652.
29. Id. See also In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1992) (describing
Iowa's proceedings in the Baby Jessica case).
30. Iowa law states that a release of custody "[sihall be signed, not less
than seventy-two hours after the birth of the child to be released, by all living
parents." IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.4(2)(g) (West 1996).
31. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Ms. Clausen had the right to revoke custody under Iowa law.
Either a parent who has signed a release of custody, or a nonsigning
parent, may, at any time prior to the entry of an order terminating
parental rights, request the juvenile court designated in section 600A.4
to order the revocation of any release of custody previously executed by
either parent. If such request is by a signing parent, and is within
ninety-six hours of the time such parent signed a release of custody, the
juvenile court shall order the release revoked. Otherwise, the juvenile
court shall order the release or releases revoked only upon clear and
convincing evidence that good cause exists for revocation. Good cause
for revocation includes but is not limited to a showing that the release
was obtained by fraud, coercion, or misrepresentation of law or fact
which was material to its execution. In determining whether good
cause, other than fraud, coercion or misrepresentation, exists for
revocation, the juvenile court shall give paramount consideration to the
best interest of the child and due consideration to the interests of the
parents of the child and of any person standing in the place of the
parents.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.4(4) (West 1996).

35. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652.
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Schmidt filed a petition to intervene in the DeBoers' adoption
proceeding in Iowa District Court. 3 The juvenile court denied Ms.
Clausen's parental rights revocation and she appealed.37
The Iowa District Court, in the meantime, found that Daniel
Schmidt was the real father, that he had not released his parental
rights, and that he had not abandoned the baby.'
The court
denied the adoption of Baby Jessica and ordered the DeBoers to
surrender custody of Baby Jessica to Mr. Schmidt.39 The DeBoers
obtained a stay of that order pending further appeal in Iowa.
On December 3, 1992, the DeBoers filed a petition in the
Washtenaw Circuit Court of Michigan, asking the court to assume
jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA).' The DeBoers asked the court to "enjoin enforcement of
36. Id.
37. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
38. Id.
39. Id. The Iowa District Court ordered the DeBoers to surrender physical
custody of Baby Jessica to Mr. Schmidt by January 12, 1992. Clausen, 502
N.W.2d at 65 n.8.
40. The primary purpose of the UCCJA is to avoid jurisdictional
competition between states by establishing uniform rules for deciding when
states have jurisdiction to make child custody determinations. Clausen, 501
N.W.2d 193, 197 (Mich. App. 1993), affd, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
During the Baby Jessica litigation, all 50 states and the Virgin Islands had
adopted the Act in one form or another.
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 261, 262-65 (West 1999). In 1997, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a new uniform
act-the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (prefatory

note), 9 U.L.A. 649, 649 (West 1999). This new Act accomplishes two major
purposes, according to the prefatory note:
[flirst, it revises the law on child custody jurisdiction in light of federal
enactments and almost thirty years of inconsistent case law. Article 2 of
[the] Act provides clearer standards for which States can exercise
original jurisdiction over a child custody determination. It also, for the
first time, enunciates a standard of continuing jurisdiction and clarifies
modification jurisdiction. Other aspects of the article harmonize the law
on simultaneous proceedings, clean hands, and forum non conveniens.
Second, [the] Act provides in Article 3 for a remedial process to enforce
interstate child custody and visitation determinations. In doing so, it
brings a uniform procedure to the law of interstate enforcement that is
currently producing inconsistent results. In many respects, [the] Act
accomplishes for custody and visitation determinations the same
uniformity that has occurred in interstate child support with the
promulgation of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).
Id. at 649-50.
As of this writing, 12 states have repealed the UCCJA and have
replaced it with the UCCJEA. ALA. CODE §§ 30-3B-101 to 30-3B-405 (Supp.
1999); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.0.300 to 25.30.910 (Michie 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25-431 to 25-454 (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-19-101 to 919-401 (Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3400 to 3465 (West Supp.
2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, §§ 1731 to 1783 (West Supp. 1999);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518D.101 to 518D.317 (West Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE
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the Iowa custody order and find that it was not enforceable, or, in
the alternative, to modify it to give custody to the DeBoers."" The
court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order in which the
court ordered Baby Jessica to remain with the DeBoers and Mr.
Schmidt "not to remove the child from Washtenaw County." 2 On
January 3, 1993, the Washtenaw Circuit Court assumed
jurisdiction to determine the best interest of the child and denied
Mr. Schmidt's motion for summary judgment."
ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to 40-7-317 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to 50A-25
(1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, §§ 551-101 to 551-402 (West Supp. 2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-6-201 to 36-6-243 (1999); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§
152.001 to 152.317 (West Supp. 2000). The law will take effect in Connecticut

on July 1, 2000. 1999 Conn. Acts 99-185 (Reg. Sess.).
The UCCJA is currently in effect in the following states and territories:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-431 to 25-454 (West Supp. 1999); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-13-101 to 14-13-126 (West Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46b-90 to 46b-114 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999) (until July 1, 2000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1901 to 1925 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4501 to 164524 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302 to 61.1348 (West 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19-9-40 to 19-9-64 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to 583-26 (1999);
IDAHO CODE §§ 32-1101 to 32-1126 (1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 to
35/26 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-3-1 to 31-17-3-25 (Michie 1997);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1 to 598A.25 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 381301 to 38-1335 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.400 to 403.620 (Michie
1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1700 to 13:1724 (West 1999); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-201 to 9-224 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209B, §§
1 to 14 (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.651 to 600.673 (West
1996); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 to 93-23-47 (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. §§
452.440 to 452.550 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1201 to 43-1225 (1998);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125A.010 to 125A.250 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 456-A:1 to 456-A:25 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-28 to
2A:34-52 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10-1 to 40-10-24
(Michie 1999); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to 75-z (McKinney 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE. §§ 14-14.1-01 to 14-14.1-30 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3109.21 to 3109.37 (Anderson 1995); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 109.700 to
109.930 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341 to 5366
(West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-14-1 to 15-14-26 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
20-7-782 to 20-7-830 (Law Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-5A-1 to 265A-26 (Michie 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45cl to 78-45c-26 (Michie 1996);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1031 to 1051 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to 20146 (Michie 1995); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 115 to 139 (1996); WASH REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.27.010 to 26.27.930 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-1 to
48-10-26 (1999); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 822.01 to 8.22.25 (West 1994); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 20-5-101 to 20-5-125 (Michie 1999).
Both Iowa and Michigan had enacted the UCCJA at the time of the
litigation, and all further reference in this Article will be to that Act.
41. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 653.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 653. The court further ordered that the child remain in the
custody of the DeBoers pending further orders. Id. On January 29, 1993, the

Iowa District Court found the DeBoers in contempt of court and issued bench
warrants for their arrest. Id. at 653 n.9. The Iowa Juvenile Court restored
Ms. Clausen's parental rights on February 17, 1993. Id. On February 12,
1993, the Washtenaw County Circuit Court handed down a bench decision,
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The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the Washtenaw
Circuit Court's denial of Mr. Schmidt's summary motion" by
concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJA
and that, based on another decision,' the DeBoers lacked standing
to bring the action." On May 6, 1993, the Michigan Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case."'
The Michigan Supreme Court noted:
Interstate enforcement of child custody orders has long presented
vexing problems. This arose principally from uncertainties about
the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution.
Because custody decrees were generally
regarded as subject to modification, states had traditionally felt free
to modify another state's prior order. 4"
The opinion noted that Congress tried to deal with the
complexities of child custody cases and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause with the passage of the UCCJA.49 However, although all
fifty states and the United States Virgin Islands have adopted the
UCCJA, additional variations and differing interpretations were
also adopted."0 Congress recognized the various interpretations
and adopted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) in

finding that "itwas in the best interest of the child for her to remain with the
DeBoers." Id.
44. The court initially denied Mr. Schmidt's application, but reconsidered it

on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court. Id. at n.10.
45. Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Mich. 1992). This case arrived in

front of the Michigan Supreme Court in the hopes of resolving several child
custody issues:

1) Does the circuit court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and
determine an original third-party custody complaint under the Child
Custody Act... ? 2) If the circuit court does have jurisdiction over such
a claim, does a third party have standing to petition for custody under
the act because the child resides with the third party, or resided with
the third party in the past? 3) Does the circuit court have subject
matter jurisdiction over an original petition for custody under the act
where there is no dispute with regard to the custody of a child? and 4)
Where there has been no finding of parental unfitness, and absent
divorce or separate maintenance proceedings, is a circuit court award of
custody to a third party rather than a parent, on the basis of the best
interest of the child, a violation of due process?

Id. (citations omitted).
46. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 653.
47. Id. at 654.
48. Id. (footnotes omitted). See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (prescribing
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State," and that the "Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof").
49. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 654.
50. See supra note 40 for a list of states adopting the UCCJA and the
UCCJEA.
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The PKPA requires that state courts "enforce a child

51. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 655. In adopting the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-911, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified'in scattered
sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), Congress 'noted iri 'the' "Findings' and
Purposes" section that
(a) ...
(1) there is a large and growing number -of cases annually-involving
disputes between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation of
children under the laws, and in the courts" of different States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,' and the
territories and possessions of the United States;
(2) the laws and practices by which the courts of those jurisdictions
determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes, and the effect to
be given the decisions of such disputes by the courts of other
jurisdictions, are often inconsistent and conflicting;
(3) those characteristics of the law and practice in such cases, along
with the limits imposed by a Federal system on the authority of each
such jurisdiction to conduct investigations and take other actions
outside its own boundaries, contribute to a tendency of parties
involved in such disputes to frequently resort to the seizure,
restraint, concealment, and interstate transportation of children, the
disregard of court orders, excessive re-litigation of cases, obtaining of
conflicting orders by the courts of various jurisdictions, and
interstate travel and communication that is so expensive and time
consuming as to disrupt their occupations and commercial activities;
and
(4) among the results of those conditions and activities are the failure
of the courts of such jurisdictions to give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of the other jurisdictions, the deprivation of
rights of liberty and property without due process of law, burdens on
commerce among such jurisdictions and with foreign nations, and
harm to the welfare of children and their parents and other
custodians.
(b) For those reasons it is necessary to establish a national system for
locating parents and children who travel from one such jurisdiction to
another and are concealed in connection with such disputes, and to
establish national standards under which the courts of such
jurisdictions will determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes
and the effect to be given by each such jurisdiction to such decisions by
the courts of other such jurisdictions.
(c) The general purposes... of this Act are to:
(1) promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a
determination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms
of mutual assistance between States which are concerned with the
same child;
(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of
sister States;
(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody
in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure
family relationships for the child;
(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts
in matters of child custody and visitation which have in the past
resulted in the shifting of children from State to State with harmful

20001

In the Best Interest of the Child

custody determination entered by a court of a sister state if the
determination is consistent with the provisions of the Act."52
The Michigan Supreme Court, applying the PKPA, ruled that
the Washtenaw Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction under the
UCCJA to modify the Iowa custody order because proceedings
were still pending in Iowa; that court also held that Michigan was
required to enforce the Iowa order.' The court remanded the case
to the Washtenaw Circuit Court to dismiss the action for "failure
to state claims upon which relief may be granted."' The final two
paragraphs of the opinion are what led to perhaps the scariest day
in Baby Jessica's life.
We direct the Washtenaw Circuit Court to enter an order enforcing
the custody orders entered by the Iowa courts. In consultation with
counsel for the Schmidts and the DeBoers, the circuit court shall
promptly establish a plan for the transfer of custody, with the
parties directed to cooperate in the transfer with the goal of easing
the child's transition into the Schmidt home. The circuit court shall
monitor and enforce the transfer process, employing all necessary
resources of the court, and shall notify the clerk of this Court 21
days following the release of this opinion of the arrangements for
the transfer of custody. The actual transfer shall take place within
10 days thereafter.
To a perhaps unprecedented degree among the matters that reach
this Court, these cases have been litigated through fervent
emotional appeals, with counsel and the adult parties pleading that
their only interests are to do what is best for the child, who is
herself blameless for this protracted litigation and the grief that it
causes. However, the clearly applicable legal principles require that
the Iowa judgment be enforced and that the child be placed in the
custody of her natural parents. It is now time for the adults to move
beyond saying that their only concern is the welfare of the child and
to put those words into action by assuring that the transfer of
promptly with minimum disruption of the
custody is accomplished
55
life of the child.

In his dissent, Justice Charles Levin stated that if this had
concerned a bale of hay instead of a child, he would have ruled
with the majority.6
effects on their well-being; and
(6) deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards.
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3568,
3568-69 (1980).
52. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 655 (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S.
174, 175-176 (1988)).
53. Id. at 656.
54. Id. at 668.
55. Id.

56. Id. at 668-69 (Levin, J., dissenting).
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At last report, Baby Jessica was developing normally in the
home of Cara and Dan Schmidt.57 In 1998, Mr. Schmidt noted that
Baby Jessica "has no recollection whatsoever of [the adoption
battle]."" However, in 1999, both sets of parents in the dispute
filed for divorce.59 Jan and Roberta DeBoer, Baby. Jessica's
adoptive parents, finalized their divorce on October. 22, 1999.'
The DeBoers stated that "the strain of the custody [battle] was
more than their [seventeen-year] marriage could withstand."6
Divorce proceedings for Dan and Cara Schmidt were also pending
at the time of this Article.62
B. The Case of Baby Richard
The Baby Richard case produced public outcry from just about
every citizen in the State of Illinois, including then-Governor Jim
Edgar and First Lady Brenda Edgar.' Similar to the Baby Jessica
case, the Baby Richard case involved a custody dispute between
the biological and the adoptive parents, but did not involve the
UCCJA or the PKPA. Instead, the case focused on the rights of
putative fathers."
Otakar Kirchner and Daniella Janikova came to the United
States from the former Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1986 and
1988, respectively, and began living together in an apartment in
Chicago.' In June 1990, Ms. Janikova announced that she was

There is a... child, "a feeling, vulnerable and [about to be] sorely put
upon little human being": Baby Girl Clausen, also known as Jessica
DeBoer, who will now be told, "employing all necessary resources of the
[Washtenaw Circuit] [Clourt," that she is not Jessie, that the DeBoers
are not Mommy and Daddy, that her name is Anna Lee Schmidt, and
that the Schmidts, whom she has never met, are Mommy and Daddy.
This child might, indeed, as the circuit judge essentially concluded, have
difficulty trying that on for size at two and one-half years, she might,
indeed, suffer an identity crisis.
Id. at 669.
57. 'Baby Jessica' Said Doing Well, ASSOcIATED PRESS, Mar. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
58. Five Years Later, Baby Jessica Has Forgotten Custody Battle, DES
MOINES REG., Aug. 5, 1998, at 6 [hereinafter Five Years Later].
59. Update: Baby Jessica, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 24, 1999, at 7.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. In fact, Illinois First Lady Brenda Edgar wrote a letter to Otakar
Kirchner during the litigation, asking him to drop the lawsuit for the sake of
Baby Richard's best interest. Michael Briggs, Mrs. Edgar Renews Appeal to
Dad, CHi. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at 3; Adrienne Drell, Mrs. Edgar's Plea:
Don't Take Richard; Governor's Wife Writes to Father, Cmu. SUN-TIMES, Jan.

27, 1995, at 1.
64. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d

181 (Ill. 1994).
65. Id.
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pregnant. The due date was March 16, 1991.' Ms. Janikova
stopped working in July 1990 to become a full-time student, and
Mr. Kirchner continued working to take care of Ms. Janikova and
to provide for her prenatal care.67
In January 1991, Mr. Kirchner returned to his native country
for approximately thirteen days "to attend to family business
related to his gravely ill grandmother.'
While he was away, Ms.
Janikova received a call from his aunt announcing that Mr.
Kirchner had married an old girlfriend in Czechoslovakia and was
on his honeymoon.69 Ms. Janikova became upset, called Mr.
Kirchner in Czechoslovakia, told him she never wanted to see him
again, and moved into a shelter for abused women in Chicago.70
Ms. Janikova told a friend that she would put the baby up for
adoption.7' On February 11, 1991, Ms. Janikova met with an
adoption lawyer and "John and Jane Doe" about the proposed
adoption.72 Ms. Janikova, the lawyer, and the Does met several
times." Each time, Ms. Janikova would not reveal the name of the
biological father because "she feared that he would assert his
parental rights."7'

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 649.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 649-50.
73. Id. at 650.
74. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650. Illinois law requires the father's consent, if the
father:

(i) was married to the mother on the date of birth of the child or within
300 days before the birth of the child, except for a husband or former
husband who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction not to

be the biological father of the child; or
(ii) is the father under a judgment for adoption or an order of parentage;
or
(iii) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6
months after birth, openly lived with the child, the child's biological
mother, or both, and held himself out to be the child's biological father
during the first 30 days following the birth of the child; or

(iv) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6
months after birth, made a good faith effort to pay a reasonable amount
of the expenses related to the birth of the child before the expiration of
30 days following the birth of the child, provided that the court may
consider in its determination all relevant circumstances, including the
financial condition of both biological parents; or
(v) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than 6
months after birth, has maintained substantial and continuous or
repeated contact with the child as manifested by: (I) the payment by the
father toward the support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum,
according to the father's means, and either (II) the father's visiting the
child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do so and
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Mr. Kirchner returned from Czechoslovakia on February 8,
1991 and, after seeing that Ms. Janikova had moved out, began
looking for her."5 Ms. Janikova, in the meantime,, had left the
shelter and moved into her uncle's home.76 Mr. Kirchner left
messages for Ms. Janikova several times at her uncle's house but
she would not return his telephone calls.77
Ms. Janikova finally met twice with Mr. Kirchner. The first
meeting occurred at a restaurant. 7s At their second meeting, she
went to his apartment and the two engaged in sexual intercourse. 9
Ms. Janikova telephoned Mr. Kirchner the next day and told him
that she never wanted to see him again. 0 Mr. Kirchner continued
phoning her but was unsuccessful in reaching her."
On March 16, 1991, Ms. Janikova gave birth to Baby
Richard. 2 Four days later, Ms. Janikova executed a "Final and

not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having
lawful custody of the child, or (III) the father's regular communication
with the child or with the person or agency having the care or custody of
the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child or
prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having
lawful custody of the child. The subjective intent of the father, whether
expressed or otherwise unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this
sub-paragraph as manifesting such intent, shall not preclude a
determination that the father failed to maintain substantial and
continuous or repeated contact with the child; or
(vi) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than six
months after birth, openly lived with the child for a period of six months
within the one year period immediately preceding the placement of the
child for adoption and openly held himself out to be the father of the
child; or
(vii) has timely registered with Putative Father Registry, as provided in
Section 12.1 of this Act, and prior to the expiration of 30 days from the
date of such registration, commenced legal proceedings to establish
paternity under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 or under the law of
the jurisdiction of the child's birth.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 50/8(b)(1)(B)(i)-(vii) (West Supp. 1999).
75. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
76. Id.

77. Id. Mr. Kirchner also tried to enlist the help of mutual friends to
contact Ms. Janikova, but without success. Id. He even gave $500 to a friend
to give to her, but Ms. Janikova refused the money. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
81. Id.
82. Id. The hospital where Baby Richard was born was not the original
hospital in which Ms. Janikova and Mr. Kirchner had planned to have the
baby. After the baby's birth, Ms. Janikova refused to identify the father of the
baby. Id. Mr. Kirchner had checked with the hospital in which they had
planned to have the baby on the anticipated due date, and for several days
afterwards, each time being told "they had no record of a Daniella Janikova."
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Irrevocable Consent to Adoption" for the baby.' On that same
day,.the Does filed a petition for adoption, stating that the father
of the child was unknown.' A notice placed in the Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin also stated that the father of the child was
unknown. . The Does received custody of Baby Richard on March
20, 1991.88

On that same day, Mr. Kirchner spoke to Ms. Janikova's
uncle by phone who told him, at Ms. Janikova's direction, that the
baby had died three days after birth.87 At that point, Mr. Kirchner
suspected that, in fact, the baby was still alive.'
Sometime between May 5 and May 10, 1991, a mutual friend
finally informed Mr. Kirchner that the baby in fact had not died,

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650. The notice complied with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 50/7(A) (West Supp. 1999), which states:
[in all such actions petitioner or his attorney shall file, at the office of
the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, an affidavit
showing that the defendant resides or has gone out of this State, or on
due inquiry cannot be found, or is concealed within this State, so that
process cannot be served upon him, and stating the place of residence of
the defendant, if known, or that upon diligent inquiry his place of
residence cannot be ascertained, the clerk shall cause publication to be
made in some newspaper published in the county in which the action is
pending. If there is no newspaper published in that county, then the
publication shall be in a newspaper published in an adjoining county in
this State, having a circulation in the county in which such action is
pending. In the event there is service on any of the parties by
publication, the publication shall contain notice of pendency of the
action, the name of the person to be adopted and the name of the parties
to be served by publication, and the date on or after which default may
be entered against such parties. Neither the name of petitioners nor the
name of any party who has either surrendered said child, has given
their consent to the adoption of the child, or whose parental rights have
been terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be included in
the notice of publication.
86. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
87. Id. Ms. Janikova's uncle told Mr. Kirchner on two other occasions after
this initial conversation that the baby had died. Id. Mr. Kirchner left a
message on the uncle's answering machine on March 26, 1991, saying, "I don't
believe the baby died." Id.
88. Id.
[HIe went to Daniella's uncle's house [after work about 3:00 a.m.], where
Daniella was living. He looked into Daniella's parked automobile to see
if there was an infant's car seat or baby bottles; he also went through
the garbage cans at the curb of the house to see if there were any
diapers or other similar items. Otakar also claims that he made inquiry
at some hospitals seeking information about Daniella and the birth of
the baby, to no avail. He also claims that some friends helped him in
searching through official public records for a birth or death certificate.
They found nothing.
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but was put up for adoption.89 On May 12, 1991, Ms. Janikova
moved back in with Mr. Kirchner and confessed to him that the
baby had been placed for adoption."
On May 18, 1991, Mr. Kirchner consulted a lawyer about the
Does' adoption of Baby Richard. 91 Mr. Kirchner and -his lawyer
filed an appearance on June 6, and on June 13, they filed a motion
for leave of court to file an answer. 2 The Cook County Circuit
Court ruled Mr. Kirchner had no standing in the adoption
proceeding.93
Mr. Kirchner and Ms. Janikova married on
September 12, 1991, and Mr. Kirchner then filed a petition to
declare paternity eleven days later.' On December 9, 1991, the
court found that Mr. Kirchner was the biological father of the
child. 5
On December 23, 1991, the Does filed an amended petition to
adopt, stating that Mr. Kirchner was an unfit parent and his
consent to the adoption was therefore not required under Illinois
law."
On May 6, 1992, the court, "by clear and convincing
evidence," ruled that Mr. Kirchner was an unfit parent because he
failed to "demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or
responsibility as to the welfare of a newborn child during the first
30 days after the birth."' The court, in its ruling, stated:
[t]hat brings me to the conclusion that the law must be strictly
complied with, and that the law provides for some interest in the
reasonable degree of interest for the child in the first thirty days of
the child's existence. Had Mr. Kirchner, instead of probing through
garbage bags, gone to [legal counsel] at that juncture there would be
no such proceedings here. She would have been in Court, that is
Daniella Janikova, and she would have been telling the world where
the child was and disclosing what interests Mr. Kirchner had in this
child. Instead of that in all this time that he wasted trying to
contact hospitals, and, again, looking through garbage, he found
nothing.98
Mr. Kirchner's parental rights were terminated on May 8, 1992,
and the court entered a judgment of adoption of Baby Richard on
May 13, 1992. 99
Mr. Kirchner filed an appeal on May 8, 1992, asking the court
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 651.
Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
96. See Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651 (basing the claim upon 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
50/8, 50/14 (West 1999)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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to reverse the judgment and give custody of Baby Richard to the
Kirchners."1 Baby Richard was two years and five months old
upon release of the appellate opinion.'0 ' The Kirchners had not yet
even seen the child.'
In its decision, the court stated that Baby Richard's best
interest must. be the -prevailing factor. 10 3 Furthermore, finding
that it would not be in the best interest of Baby Richard to
"disturb the judgment of adoption," the court upheld the adoption
and judgment of the circuit court. 1 4
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,'0 5 Justice James
Heiple, writing the majority opinion,' 6 disagreed with the
appellate court's reliance on the best interest of the child standard
to the facts of this case.' 7 This opinion caused a great outcry from
every sector of the state."
The public outcry increased the

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 653.
Id.
Id. at 652.

In an adoption, custody or abuse case,.., the child is the real party in
interest.

Since the child is the real party in interest, it is his best

interest and corollary rights that come before anything else, including
the interests and rights of biological and adoptive parents. Here, by

inherent necessity, whether or not raised by the embroiled and warring
biological and adoptive parents, the best interest of Richard surfaces as
the paramount issue in the case. If there is a conflict between Richard's
best interest and the rights and interests of his parents, whomever they
may be, the rights and interests of the parents must yield and allow the
best interest of Richard to pass through and prevail. This tenet allows
for no exception.
Id.
104. Id. at 654.
105. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994).
106. See id. at 181-83 (citing no case law for the majority's justification).
107. Justice Heiple's opinion stated:
the appellate court, wholly missing the threshold issue in this case,
dwelt on the best interests of the child. Since, however, the father's
parental interest was improperly terminated, there was no occasion to
reach the factor of the child's best interests. That point should never
have been reached and need never have been discussed.
Id. at 182. Justice Heiple further wrote, "[i]f [the] best interests of the child

were a sufficient qualification to determine child custody, anyone with
superior income, intelligence, education, etc., might challenge and deprive
the parents of their right to their own children." Id. at 183.
108. Cook County Public Guardian Patrick Murphy, in acknowledging that
the ruling would discourage many prospective couples from adopting, noted,
"[i]f I were a lawyer advising a family to adopt a kid with an unknown father,
I'd say, 'You're crazy.'" Jan Crawford Greenburg, "Baby Richard" Ordered
Returned to Birth Parents; Court Rules for Adults' Interests, Cm. TRIB., June
17, 1994, § 1, at 1. A letter to the editor summed up the entire case.
They allowed "Baby Richard" to be adopted and then changed their
minds. At first, they decided to look at his best interest and then they
decided not to. This is not fair to him. His whole world as he knows it is
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momentum to persuade the court to reconsider the opinion.'9
Many scathing editorials targeted Justice Heiple, because his
opinion failed to fully explain the court's reasoning.' 1°
In the court's denial of rehearing,"' Justice Heiple blasted the
adoptive parents for allowing the litigation to continue for as long
as it did."' However, Justice Heiple did not stop. there: He also
criticized Chicago Tribune syndicated columnist Bob Greene who
"used this unfortunate controversy to stimulate readership and
generate a series of syndicated newspaper columns in the Chicago
Tribune and other papers that are both false and misleading.""'
In several paragraphs of his opinion-with citations provided,Justice Heiple said that Mr. Greene was filling his columns with
going to be torn apart. He is going to be taken away from the most
important people in the world to him-mommy and daddy.
Susan Cohen, Letter to the Editor, His World is Gone, CHI.TRIB., June 25,
1994, § 1, at 22.
109. Former Illinois Governor Jim Edgar tried to enter the case as an amicus
party, a move the court rejected. In re Doe, No. 76063 (InI. July 7, 1994) (order
denying motion of Governor Jim Edgar to file a brief amicus curiae) (on file
with the Author). The Author also tried to enter the case as an amicus party
and was also rejected. Id. (order denying motion of Gregory A. Kelson to file a
brief amicus curiae) (on file with the Author). Governor Edgar and the
Author's motions were denied within 20 minutes of each other-both orders
were signed by Justice Heiple.
110. See, e.g., More Rancor Over "Baby Richard," CHI.TRIB., July 14, 1996, §
1,at 26 (stating that:
[wihatever one thinks of the Illinois Supreme Court's latest action in the
"Baby Richard" case, one thing is clear: Justice James Heiple did
himself, the court and the cause of justice no good whatever by his
intemperate attacks on his critics-no matter how well-deserved he
thought such attacks may have been).
One television news anchor in Chicago, who had repeatedly blasted the
Illinois Supreme Court in this case during his newscasts, even went so far
as to release Justice Heiple's home phone number on a news broadcast and
asked viewers to call him at home to voice their opinion on this case. See
Mike Royko, TV Newsman is a Gas, CLEVE. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 16, 1995,
at 11B.
111. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 187 (Heiple, J., supplemental opinion denying
rehearing).
112. Id. at 188. Heiple further stated:
[iinstead of [the adoptive parents relinquishing custody of Baby Richard
to the Kirchners when the adoption was contested by Mr. Kirchner, the
adoptive parents] were able to procure an entirely erroneous ruling from
a trial judge that allowed the adoption to go forward. The father's only
remedy at that stage was a legal appeal which he took. He is not the
cause of the delay in this case. It was the adoptive parents' decision to
prolong this litigation through a long and ultimately fruitless appeal.
Now, the view has been expressed that the passage of time warrants
their retention of the child; that it would not be fair to the child to
return him to his natural parents, now married to each other, after the
adoptive parents have delayed justice past the child's third birthday.
Id.
113. Id.
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"half-truths,
character
argumentation." '

assassination

and

spurious

Justice Heiple, spared neither former Illinois Governor Jim
Edgar from his, wrath nor anyone else in the Illinois General
Assembly, for -that matter. "The Governor, in a crass political
move, announced his attempt to intervene in the case. And the
General Assembly, without meaningful debate or consideration,
rushed into law a constitutionally infirm statute with the goal of
changing the [Illinois] Supreme Court's decision."" 5
Heiple
suggested that the Governor and the "General Assembly "return to
the classroom and take up Civics 101. 116
After the court handed down the decision, the Kirchners and
the Does began to negotiate for the transfer of custody of Baby
Richard."7 However, on February 28, 1995, Mr. Kirchner, upset
with the progress of the negotiations, went to the Illinois Supreme
Court and obtained a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Baby
Richard."' Lawyers for both the adoptive parents and the Cook
County Public Guardian requested a stay of this order from United
States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens.' 9
Justice
Stevens denied this request." ° Although Mr. Kirchner had the
legal authority to take Baby Richard from the Does, he said he
wanted to wait "to be introduced to the child and get to know him
,
first. "'
The Does and the Cook County Public Guardian filed with the
United States Supreme Court for another stay, this time in front
of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor."' Justice O'Connor, perhaps
unwilling to overrule a fellow justice, referred the motion to the

114. Id. at 188-90.

115. Id. at 190. Governor Edgar was running for re-election at the time of
this ruling, which is probably what Justice Heiple was referring to in this
statement. Soon after the June 16, 1994 ruling, the Illinois General Assembly
quickly passed a bill that stated courts must consider the best interest of the
child in all adoption matters. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 50/20 and 50/20a
(West Supp. 1999) (applying the provisions of the Civil Practice Law and the
Best Interest Standard to adoptions). The bill was signed within a few days of
passage by Governor Edgar with the hopes that the court would retroactively
apply it to the case. Id. However, the Illinois Supreme Court specifically
ruled that the law did not apply to this case. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324,
337 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995).

116. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 190.
117. Hanan & Kendall, supra note 9, § 1, at 3.

118. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 329.
119. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1303, 1305 (Stevens, Circuit Justice
1995).

120. Id.
121. Janan Hanna & Louise Kiernan, 'Baby Richard' Case Mired in
Mistrust; His Best Interests Forgotten as Adults Are to Blame for His Day of
Upheaval, CHI.TRIB., May 2, 1995, § 1, at 1.
122. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138, 1138 (1995).
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full Court. 2 3 The Court denied the motion for the stay."" Justice

O'Connor noted, however, that the Illinois Supreme Court had not
considered an amendment
to the Illinois Adoption Act when it
125
issued its order.

In supporting a stay of ten days after the release of the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision or forty-five days after the
decision of the United States Supreme Court, whichever came
first, Justice O'Connor reasoned, "I believe that in this case,
'disrupting the status quo forthwith... has consequences whose
disadvantages, from the point of view of the child's interests,
outweigh any loss to the [biological father] that may result from a
short delay in acquiring custody of the child.'' 26
When Baby Richard left the Does' home, Mr. Kirchner
promised him that he would see his adoptive brother, the Does'
older son. 127 No reports of any such meeting exist. For Baby
Richard's eighth birthday, the Does sent the Kirchners a bicycle to
give to him, but the Kirchners returned the gift unopened.'28
In 1997, Otakar and Daniella Kirchner separated, leaving
Baby Richard in the custody of Daniella Kirchner."2
Mrs.
Kirchner filed a motion with the Cook County Circuit Court to
restore the parental rights that she abandoned in 1991 when she
gave the child up for adoption. 3 0 However, because the Does and
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services tried to
intervene in the case, the Kirchners asked Cook County Circuit
Court Judge Gay-Lloyd Lott to dismiss the motion."' Judge Lott
refused the motion and ordered an investigation into Baby
Richard's home life, effectively reopening the case."32 The
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The opinion proceeds further:

we can only speculate about the Illinois Supreme Court's rationale for
avoiding application of a state law that appears to mandate a "best
interests" hearing. The court may have rested its decision on state law
grounds, either finding the provision altogether inapplicable in this

habeas proceeding or determining that it violated the state constitution.
On the other hand, the court may have rested its decision on a
conclusion that [the new law] runs afoul of the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 1139 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 1140 (quoting Sklaroff v. Skeadas, 76 S. Ct. 736, 738 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., in chambers)).
127. Janan Hanna, 'Richard' Reunion Planned; Boy Would Meet with ExBrother, CHi. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1995, § 1, at 1.

128. Michael Sneed, A Sad Note.. ., CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1999, at 7.
129. Janan Hanna, Legal Door Could Reopen in 'Richard' Case; Adoptive
ParentsFace New Question, Ci. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1997, § 2, at 1.
130. Janan Hanna, 'Richard'Mom Wants Parental Rights, CHi. TRIB., July
18, 1997, § 2, at 1 [hereinafter 'RichardMom Wants ParentalRights].

131. John Flynn Rooney, Order End to New 'Richard' Case: Mother, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 4, 1997, at 1.
132. Id.
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Kirchners filed an emergency request with the Illinois Supreme
Court for a supervisory order to direct Judge Lott to dismiss the
case. 13 The Illinois Supreme Court issued an unsigned threesentence order on August 4, 1997, directing Judge Lott to dismiss
the case."
II. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD
Countless custody cases in all fifty states have used the
But what
standard phrase, "the best interest of the child.""
exactly is meant by the term "best interest of the child," and how
do courts determine this standard? One commentator has stated
that "[t]he 'best interest' of a child is a phrase that gets tossed
This Section
around loosely."" 6 Is it sound legal principle?
attempts to answer that question.
A. Definition of Best Interest of the Child Standard
Society places the well-being of children in the hands of
adults who are presumably more competent to care for them."7
The state has the responsibility, however, to determine who those
adults should be." Usually, the "preferred" adults are the child's
biological parents.'39 Perhaps the next most "preferred" adult
Custody
would be a blood relative of the biological parents.'
disputes pitting biological parents against third parties involve
"apply[ing] standards that are either parent-focused or childOne commentator has noted that regardless of which
focused."'
standard courts apply, both standards have "different hurdles.""

133. Id.
134. Janan Hanna, High Court Slams Door Again on 'Richard',CHI. TRIB.,

Aug. 5, 1997, § 2, at 1.
135. Ex parte Lipscomb, 660 So. 2d 986, 989 (Ala. 1994); McQuade v.
McQuade, 901 P.2d 421, 423 (Alaska 1995); In re Hartley, 886 P.2d 441, 443

(Colo. 1994); Shiffilet v. Shifflet, 891 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Ky. 1995); Hayes v.
Rounds, 658 So. 2d 863, 865 (Miss. 1995); In re Adam, 903 P.2d 207, 209

(Mont. 1995); Seabra v. Trafford-Seabra, 655 A.2d 250, 253 (R.I. 1995); Jacobs
v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1995).
136. Anthony S. Zito, Baby Richard and Beyond: The Future for Adopted
Children, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 445, 446 (1998).

137. "Children... are presumed to be incomplete beings who are not fully
competent to determine and safeguard their interests. They are seen as
dependent and in need of direct, intimate, and continuous care by the adults
who are personally committed to assume such responsibility." JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3 (1973).

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Melanie B. Lewis, Casenote, Inappropriate Application of the Best

Interests of the Child StandardLeads to Worst Case Scenario: In re C.C.R.S.,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 259, 261 (1997).

142. Id.
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On one end of the spectrum, the parental rights staridard requires a
showing of unfitness of the natural parents before the child's best
interests can be considered. On the other eAd of the spectrum, the
child's best interest standard considers only fact6rs affeting' the
child's welfare with no consideration of the claims of .the, adults
involved. 4 3
.

Critics of the best interest of the child standard cite three
reasons why it should not be used in determining custody cases: 1)
"it does not provide enough protection for the rights of natural
parents; " 2) "by basing custody decisions on psychological ties
between the child and nonparents, the best interest -standard
creates an incentive for nonparents to wrongfully gain custody of a
child;" 1'5 and 3) "[it] has the potential for misuse because the
standard is based on vague or nonexistent criteria, opening the
custody decision to social biases."46
Perhaps the best case exemplifying this concept is Painter v.
Bannister.4 1 In this case, a widower left his seven-year-old son in
the temporary custody of the boy's maternal grandparents, who
would not give custody back to the father even though he had
remarried and asked for the return of his son.148
The opinion points out the economic and social differences
4
between the boy's father and mother's family1'
and states, "[i]t is
not our prerogative to determine custody upon our choice of one of
two ways of life within normal and proper limits and we will not
do so."' However, in comparing the households of the father and
maternal grandparents, the court stated:
[tihe Bannister home provides [the boy] with a stable, dependable,
conventional, middleclass, middle-west background and an
opportunity for a college education and profession, if he desires it. It
provides a solid foundation and secure atmosphere. In the Painter
home, [the boy] would have more freedom of conduct and thought
with an opportunity to develop his individual talents. It would be
more exciting and challenging in many respects, but romantic,

143. Id. at 261-62 (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 265.
145. Id. (footnote omitted).
146. Lewis, supra note 141, at 266.
147. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
148. Id. at 153.
149. Id. at 154. The opinion noted that the boy's mother was a college
graduate while his father "flunked out of a high school and a trade school
because of a lack of interest in academic subjects, rather than any lack of
ability." Id. The father, who was the Appellee in this case, did receive his
high school diploma after receiving an honorable discharge from the navy. Id.
He completed two and a half years of college afterwards before dropping out to
take a job with a small newspaper. Id.
150. Id.
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impractical and unstable.' 5 '
In ruling specifically that the best' interest of the child standard
prevail over, all other factors, the court declared:
[w]e have a ,great deal of sympathy for a father, who in the difficult
period of adjustment following his wife's death, turns to the
maternal ,grandparents for their help and then finds them unwilling
t6 return the child. There is no merit in the Bannister claim that
Mr. Painter permanently relinquished custody. It was intended to
be a temporary arrangement. A father should be encouraged to look
for help with the children, from those who love them without the
risk of thereby losing the custody of the children permanently. This
fact must receive consideration in cases of this kind. However, as
always, the primary considerationis the best interest of the child and
if the return of custody to the father is likely to have a seriously
disrupting and disturbing effect upon the child's development, this
fact must prevail.
In reversing the judgment of the Iowa (Story) District Court, the
court held:
[wie do not believe it is for [the boy's] best interest to take him out of
this stable atmosphere [of his grandparents' home] in the face of
warnings of dire consequences from an eminent child psychologist
and send him to an uncertain future in his father's home.
Regardless of our appreciation of the father's love for his child and
his desire to have him with him, we do not believe we have the
moral right to gamble with this child's future. He should be
encouraged in every way possible to know his father. We are sure
there
are many ways in which Mr. Painter can enrich [the boy's]
1
life. 5
B.

Definition of ParensPatriae

The State has a major responsibility, as parens patriae,M to
safeguard children. If necessary, the state has the responsibility
under this doctrine to remove children from the custody of their
parents. 55 One court has noted that:
[wihile parents enjoy an inherent right to the care and custody of
their own children, the State in its recognized role of parens patriae
is the ultimate protector of the rights of minors. The State has a
substantial interest in providing for their health, safety, and
welfare, and may properly step in to do so when necessary.... This
parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of the child favors

151. Id.
152. Painter,140 N.W.2d at 156 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 158.
154. "The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider
of protection to those unable to care for themselves."
BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
155. Ex rel. Paul B. v. Hill, 496 S.E.2d 198, 207 (W. Va. 1997).
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preservation, not severance, of natural family bonds.... The
countervailing State interest in curtailing child abuse is also great.
In cases of suspected abuse or neglect, the State has a clear
separate
interesting in protecting the child and may, if necessary,
156
abusive or neglectful parents from their children.
Courts have recognized the right of natural parents "to retain
custody over and care for their children, and to rear their children
This right, however, is not
as they deem appropriate."157
absolute." "The parent's right to custody is subject to the child's
interest in his personal health and safety and the state's interest
as parenspatriae in protecting that interest.""9
If placement with the biological family does not serve the best
interest of the child, it is the responsibility of the State, in its role
as parens patriae, to place the child in a home where he can
develop normally." However, once the State places the child, that
placement is where the child should remain for the remainder of
his or her childhood.
III. THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
This Section analyzes adoption proceedings that have
progressed ostensibly without considering a child's "best interests"
or a child's constitutional rights.
Courts have traditionally ruled that minor children have no

156. Id. (quoting In re Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326, 329 (W. Va. 1988))
(omissions in original).
157. White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 735 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 913
(1997) (quoting Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir.
1994)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Colin McMahon & Susan Kuczka, 19 Kids Found in Filth; Police
Describe West Side Apartment As 'A Pig Sty," CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 1994, § 1, at 1
(reporting on perhaps the best example of a state using its powers as parens
patriaein what became known as the "North Keystone case" in Chicago).
Police found 19 children living in an apartment. Id. They also found in
the apartment six adults, four women and two men. Id. The four women were
believed to be the mothers of 15 of the children, one of the males was an uncle
to many of the children, the other male was the father to at least one child. Id.
The apartment was "like a pig sty," according to one of the police
officers who responded to the drug complaint at the apartment. Philip J.
O'Connor & Ray Long, Police Rescue 19 Kids in Filthy Apartment, CHI. SUNTIMES, Feb. 2, 1994, at 1. The official police report described the apartment as
having "dirty dishes on the floor and in the sink, and in the pantry there was
moldy food and cockroaches everywhere." Id. Other descriptions mentioned
that the ceiling was falling in, there was a foul odor of spoiled food from a
malfunctioning refrigerator, and there were feces on the floor. Id. The State
of Illinois moved in quickly to take custody of the children. Most of the
children went into foster care. Ellen Warren, 'Keystone Kids" Find World of
Good; All 19 Recovering From Life in Squalor, CHI. TRIB., July 30, 1995, § 2,
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legal standing in court unless a guardian, a "next friend," or a
guardian ad litem represents them.161 Most states are required "to
protect the interests of minor children, particularly those of tender
years.""e "The appointment of a guardian ad litem for an infant
defendant is not a mere formality, but has for its basis the
A question
protection of the rights of one under disability.""
remains whether children have any rights in adoption
proceedings.
A. Adoption Proceedingsand the Due Process Clause
Concern exists over whether adoption proceedings comport
The Fourteenth
with traditional notions of due process.
Constitution
states,
in part, "[no]
Amendment to the United States
State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."" The United States Supreme Court
has also stated that "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is
not beyond the protection of the Constitution.""
Furthermore, the Court has noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee against a state's "deprivation of liberty
without due process is applicable to children in juvenile
delinquency proceedings.""' Sadly, an adoptee has not attained
the recognition of those rights afforded to juvenile delinquents.
However, children should be entitled to "the same constitutional
167
guarantees against governmental deprivations as... adults."
A child has the right to representation by counsel in an
adoption proceeding. One commentator has noted that:
[riegardless of whether the child or the attorney more correctly
perceives what is in fact better for the child, the constitutional
purpose of providing a person with representation is to enable him
effectively to present his views to the court. The fourteenth
amendment does not require the "best" result for the person whose
161. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
reh'g denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a child lacked capacity to
initiate a proceeding to terminate his mother's parental rights) (citations
omitted). The court stated that:
[tihe necessity of a guardian ad litem or next friend, the alter ego of a
guardian ad litem, to represent a minor is required by the orderly
administration of justice and the procedural protection of a minor's
welfare and interest by the court and, in this regard, the fact that a
minor is represented by counsel, in and of itself, is not sufficient. Unless
a child has a guardian or other like fiduciary, a child must sue by his
next friend; however, the next friend does not become a party to the suit.
Id. (citations omitted).
162. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
163. Allen v. Hickman, 383 P.2d 676, 678 (Okla. 1963).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
165. Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
166. Id. at 634 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 635 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
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interests are at.stake; rather, it requires that a person be heard in
the proceedings which affect his interests.
Since in custody
proceedings the child's interests are at stake, due process requires
that his preferences be expressed and considered.' 6"
It is important however, that the child's counsel, be it a guardian
ad litem or a "next friend," represent the child's interests and not
those of the biological parents or third parties.
B.

What Issues of Standing Arise for Children in Adoption
Proceedings?

Do children have the right to speak in adoption proceedings,
or may a court "silence" them because of their age?
Kingsley v. Kingsley involved a minor who brought suit
against his natural mother to terminate her parental rights so his
foster family could adopt him. 9 The mother claimed that her
minor son had no right to initiate a parental rights hearing on his
own behalf. 7 ° The Florida District Court of Appeals agreed and
ruled that minors do not have capacity to bring a termination of
parental rights action.17
The Kingsley decision used incorrect reasoning. Although the
State does reserve the right to exert some control in order to
protect a child's best interest, the United States Supreme Court
has stated that minors are entitled to the same constitutional

rights as adults.
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights.... The Court indeed, however, long has
recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to
172
regulate the activities of children than of adults.
Justice John Paul Stevens further clarified this point.
The State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a
variety of protective measures. Because he may not foresee the
consequences of his decision, a minor may not make an enforceable
bargain. He may not lawfully work or travel where he pleases, or
even attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult motion
pictures. Persons below a certain age may not marry without

168. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 207
n.18 (1996) [hereinafter IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD] (quoting P.K.
Milmed, Due Process for Children:A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings,
4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 177, 187-88 (1974)).
169. 623 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), reh'g denied, 634 So. 2d
625 (Fla. 1994).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (citations
omitted).
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parental consent. Indeed, such consent is essential even when the
The State's interest in
young woman is already pregnant.
protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition of
restraints on his or her freedom even though com7arable restraints
on adults would be constitutionally impermissible.
Most states require the appointment of a guardian ad litem or
a "next friend" to represent the child's interest in any judicial
proceeding. 74 The required representation exists because minors
do not have the capacity to initiate legal proceedings in their own
name. 7 Courts have historically required an adult to represent
the child's interest because "if a minor mistakenly brings an action
subsequent
in his own name such defect can be cured by the
76
litem."
appointment of a next friend or guardian ad
C.

Whose Interest Should Prevail?

The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the Illinois Adoption
Act was "designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive
rights to their own children wholly apart from any consideration of
the so-called best interest of the child. If it were otherwise, few
77
parents would be secure in the custody of their own children."
The court further noted in the Baby Richard case that "there was
no occasion to reach the factor of [Baby Richard's] best interests.
That point should never have been reached and need never have
been discussed."78
Another remaining question in solving the equation of the
best interest of the child formula in adoption proceedings asks,
whose interests should prevail, those of adults or of children? The
Baby Richard opinion implied that it should be the adult over the
child. 179 A concurring and dissenting opinion in Kingsley made this

173. Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-153(e) (1999); IOWA CODE § 232.89(2)
(1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.041(1) (Michie 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43104.05 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-20 (Michie 1999); TEX. CODE ANN.
§ 107.001(a) (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-9(2) (Michie 1999); and VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 669 (1999).
175. See e.g., Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 783 (quoting Earls v. King, 785 S.W.2d
741, 743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) as saying "[clapacity to sue is the right to come
into court which exists if one is free of general disability, such as infancy or
insanity. Nearly all adults have capacity to sue").
176. Id. at 784.
177. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
178. Id.
179. Justice Heiple wrote in a supplemental opinion to the Baby Richard
case that:
[t]he best interest of the child standard is not to be denigrated. It is
real. However, it is not triggered until it has been validly determined
that the child is available for adoption. And, a child is not available for
adoption until the rights of his natural parents have been properly
terminated. Any judge, lawyer, or guardian ad litem who has even the
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point very clear.
Termination of parental rights requires a two step process. First,
did the parents do something that the State has determined to be
sufficiently egregious to permit forfeiture of their right to continue
as parents (abuse, neglect, abandonment, voluntary consent to
adoption)? Unless the answer to this first question is affirmative,
the second step in the analysis (the best interest of the child) is
unnecessary. 180
However, even though courts might consider the best interest
of the child in adoption proceedings, final placement of the child is
often completed to satisfy the adult parties to the proceedings and
not follow what is truly in the child's best interest.181
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This Article has provided the background to, and presented
the need for, a uniform "best interest of the child" standard that
can be implemented in all adoption proceedings in the United
States. This is not an easy task, considering the complexity of
adoption laws and adoption situations across the United States.
Problems concerning biological versus potential adoptive parents
must be addressed. Further, there are also situations of families
going to court to sue for custody of a child because they feel that
the child would be better-off in their custody. 82
The following includes a plan and several policy
recommendations that will make cases such as Baby Jessica and
Baby Richard non-existent in the Twenty-first Century.
A. Recommendations
No easy answer exists for the question of how adoptions
should be handled that would be in the best interest of all parties
involved: biological parents, adoptive parents, and children. How
should a court view these parties in proceeding with such cases?
most cursory familiarity with adoption laws knows that.
Id. at 189 (emphasis in original).
180. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 790 (Harris, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
181. Oftentimes, the best interest of the child standard is not construed
according to its apparent meaning:
[tihe child's interests are often balanced against, and frequently made
subordinate to, adult interests and rights.
Moreover, and less
forthrightly, many decisions are "in-name-only" for the best interest of
the specific child who is being placed. They are fashioned primarily to
meet the needs and wishes of competing adult claimants or to protect
the general policies of a child care or other administrative agency.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 137, at 54 (footnotes omitted).
182. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 106 (Va. 1995) (dealing
with a grandmother who sued for custody of her grandson from her daughter
because the daughter was in a lesbian relationship).
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The Child

a. Courts Should Use the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard
The best interest of the child should be the primary concern
in determining custody. This is the law in several states,
including Illinois and Michigan."8 Justice Heiple wrote in the
Baby Richard case that the Illinois Appellate Court, which upheld
the adoption of Baby Richard,
wholly miss[ed] the threshold issue in this case, [and] dwelt on the
best interests of the child. Since, however, the father's parental
interest was improperly terminated, there was no occasion to reach
the factor of the child's best interest. That point should never have
been reached and need never have been discussed.'"

b. Courts Should Consider the Age of the Child When Organizing
Dockets
A major factor that courts need to consider is the age of the
child as he proceeds through the adoption process. By the time the
Baby Richard case reached the Illinois Appellate Court, the child
was two and a half years old.1" Litigation should never take this
long. The child faces more impediments and emotional trauma if
he is removed from his foster/adoptive family at a later age.
Courts need to make custody cases such as these a priority in their
dockets.
c. Courts Should Treat the Child as a "Party in Interest" to the
Proceedings
The courts should realize, as Justice Levin noted in his
dissent of the Baby Jessica case, that the child is a party in
interest.1" The child is not property; courts and adult litigants
should not treat them as such.
2. Biological Parents

a. Courts Should Ensure that Both Biological Parents have an
Opportunity to Comment on the Adoption
In both the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases, the
biological mothers initiated the adoption procedure without
involvement of the biological fathers. In the Baby Jessica case, the
183. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/20a (West Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.25 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).

184. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
185. See supra text accompanying note 101.
186. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 699 (Mich. 1993) (Levin, J.,
dissenting).
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mother named another man who was not the biological father so
that the adoption would proceed. 187 In the Baby Richard case, the
mother told the biological father that his son had died." The
father was given reports of the child's "death" with the hopes that
such reports would halt any interference in the adoption
proceedings. 89 In both cases, although the biological mothers
tricked the biological fathers, the fathers maintained legal rights
to prevent their children's adoptions.' Another factor here is that
neither biological mother was married to the biological father at
the time of the birth of their children. 8 '
A mechanism must be put into place assuring that both
biological parents have the opportunity to comment on a proposed
adoption of their child. Illinois, in response to the Baby Richard
case, instituted a registry for putative fathers that allows
States also need to
individuals to assert their legal rights.'
assure that the names of both parents are listed on the birth
certificate of the child, regardless of whether the father is
supporting the child.
b. Courts Should Inquire into the Mental Well-Being of the
Biological Parents
Another important issue to consider in the best interest of the
child is the psychological well-being of the parents--especially the
biological mother. Both mothers in the Baby Jessica and Baby
Richard cases gave up their children to spite the biological fathers,
but regretted their action afterwards and tried to regain custody of
their children through a reversal of the termination of parental
rights.'93 A psychologist should consult with the biological parents
to determine the reasons for the adoption and whether it would be
in the best interest of the child for them to consent to the adoption.
The psychologist's findings should carry some weight, but not be
relied on as the final decision-that decision should still rest with
the biological parents as to whether they will consent to the
termination of their parental rights and adoption of their children
by a third party.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 658.
Doe, 638 N. E.2d at 181-82.
Id.
Clausen, 502 N.W. 2d at 658; Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
However, in both cases, Dan Schmidt and Cara Clausen, the parents of

Baby Jessica, and Otakar Kirchner and Daniella Janikova, the parents of

Baby Richard, did subsequently marry before assuming custody of their
children. See Five Years Later, supra note 58, at 6 (updating marital status of
the Schmidts). Hanna, supra note 130, at 1.
192. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1 (West 1999).
193. Five Years Later, supra note 58, at 6. 'Richard'Mom Wants Parental
Rights, supra note 130, § 2, at 1.
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3. Adoptive Parents
Of the three parties of interest, the adoptive parents have
probably been the most neglected in the adoption process. Despite
the cooperation of the adoptive parents in the adoption process,
adoptive parents frequently bear the loss of custody in challenged
cases. Adoptive parents should not receive final custody of the
child until the court determines that all legal hurdles have been
cleared, in terms of assuring the best interest of the child and that
parental rights have been properly terminated. Once the adoptive
parents receive custody of the child, all legal proceedings should
terminate to ensure that the child now has a stable home.
B. Conclusion
Many children in the United States are very fortunate to be
raised by their biological parents who give them love,
encouragement, and will care for their well-being and interests.
However, problems frequently arise regarding the best interest of
potentially adoptable children. For many of these children, foster
care may be the only way to give them a stable home, although
foster placements frequently do not result in permanent homes.
The aftermath of the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard
decisions raised fear among adoptive parents, since the possibility
arose that biological parents could change their minds at any time
and regain custody of their children. Legislative and judicial
action are needed to insure that once a child is placed for adoption,
that adoption will not be disturbed in the future.
Children are not property. The manner in which a child
grows up to become an adult will determine how productive he will
be in society. To that end, it is important to provide the child with
a stable home, free from distractions, where he can develop
normally. Contrary to what courts have held throughout this
nation, the best interest of the child should always prevail in
adoption proceedings.

